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This paper studies the design of optimal, privately-stipulated damages when breach of contract is
possible at more than one point in time. It o￿ers an intuitive explanation for why cancellation fees
for some services (e.g., hotel reservations) increase as the time for performance approaches. If the seller
makes investments over time to improve her value from trade, she will protect the value of her investments
by demanding a higher compensation when the buyer breaches their contract at a time closer to when
contract performance is due.
Furthermore, it is shown that if the seller may be able to ￿nd an alternate buyer when breach occurs
early but not when breach occurs late, the amount by which the damage for late breach exceeds the
damage for early breach is increasing in the probability of ￿nding an alternate buyer. (This result may
explain why some hotels impose larger penalties for last-minute cancellations during the high season than
during the low season.)
When the probability of ￿nding an alternate buyer is endogenized, the seller’s private incentive
to mitigate breach damages is shown to be socially insu￿cient whenever she does not have complete
bargaining power with the alternate buyer. Finally, if renegotiation is possible after the arrival of each
perfectly competitive entrant, the e￿cient breach and investment decisions are shown to be implementable
with the same e￿cient expectation damages that implement the e￿cient outcomes absent renegotiation.1 Introduction
Contracts for the provision of services frequently have cancellation fees that penalize the party who backs
out before the contract expires or before the date of performance of the contract. For example, vacation
resorts often set two separate fees for cancellation of lodging reservations: an early cancellation fee if
the reservation is cancelled with su￿cient advanced notice, and a late cancellation fee, which is usually
larger, if the reservation is cancelled \at the last minute." Furthermore, the di￿erence between the fees
for late cancellation and early cancellation is often larger during the high season, when demand is higher.
What causes such variations in breach damages with respect to when a contract is signed and when it is
breached? This paper proposes a possibile explanation by allowing for the possibility of contract breach
and investment at multiple points in time.
Suppose that when the contract is signed, the buyer is uncertain about the value of his outside
option at various future points in time and may therefore breach the contract before his performance
(payment) is due. If the seller has multiple opportunities over time to make non-contractible, cost-
reducing investments that improve her value from trade, she will want to protect the value of those
investments by demanding a higher compensation for contract breach that occurs later, or closer in time
to when contract performance is due. Therefore, the buyer’s decision of whether to breach early or late
involves a trade o￿ between the option value of not breaching early (and waiting for a potentially cheaper
supplier to arrive later) versus the higher penalty associated with potentially breaching late.
The law and economics literature on contract breach began by considering the e￿ciency of standard
court-imposed damage measures in a setting where the buyer faces an alternate source of supply that
is competitively priced. In particular, Shavell (1980) and Rogerson (1984) considered, respectively, the
situations where the incumbent seller and buyer cannot and can renegotiate their initial contract. The
common ￿nding in both cases is that standard court-imposed damages generally induce socially excessive
investment.
The e￿ciency of privately stipulated, or liquidated, damages for breach of contract has also been
previously addressed, notably by Aghion and Bolton (1987) (assuming no investment or renegotiation),
Chung (1992) (allowing for investments but not renegotiation), and Spier and Whinston (1995) (assuming
both investments and renegotiation). The common focus of these papers is on the strategic stipulation
of socially excessive breach damages when the entrant seller has market power, i.e., when the incumbent
seller and buyer’s original contract imposes externalities on third parties.
2
In contrast, I assume that third parties have no bargaining power with the incumbent seller and
buyer. Instead, the key innovation of this paper is the existence of multiple opportunities for breach of
contract, which is due to the sequential arrival of two potential entrants. Section 2 introduces the rest
of the model in detail, and Section 3 characterizes the ex-ante e￿cient breach and investment decisions.
In the event of breach, expectation damages compensate the breached-against party (in this case, the
2Most of the literature on contract damages, including this paper and those cited above, assumes investments are sel￿sh in
that they only directly a￿ect the investing party’s payo￿s. Che and Chung (1999), however, assume cooperative investments,
which directly a￿ect the payo￿s of the non-investing party. They show that the relative social desirability of expectation
damages, liquidated damages, and reliance damages are di￿erent when investments are cooperative instead of sel￿sh.seller) for the pro￿t that she would have made had breach not occurred, given her actual investment
decision. By comparison, e￿cient expectation damages compensate the breach-against party for the
pro￿t she would have made absent breach { had she chosen the e￿cient investment level. First, absent
externalities and assuming renegotiation is impossible, I demonstrate in Section 4 that the incumbent
parties can implement the e￿cient breach and investment decisions in both periods by stipulating the
e￿cient expectation damages in their contract. This result can be viewed as an extention to multiple
periods of the well-known result that the e￿cient expectation damages is socially e￿cient when renego-
tiation is not possible.
3 Furthermore, I show that e￿cient expectation damages for late breach exceed
those for early breach.
In a related paper, Chan and Chung (2005) also considers at a two-period model of contract breach
with sequential investment opportunities. They focus on standard court-imposed breach rememdies and
do not allow for renegotiation. In contrast, the main motivations of this paper are to provide explanations
for why privately stipulated damages might increase over time as the date of performance approaches,
and to examine the robustness of this result to the possibility of renegotiation. Another related paper is
Triantis and Triantis (1998), which studies a continuous time model of contract breach and assumes that
breach damages are increasing over time. The present paper can be viewed as providing a framework
that justi￿es such an assumption when damages are privately stipulated.
Another novel feature of this model is the possibility that the seller may ￿nd an alternate buyer
when the incumbent buyer breaches early but not when he breaches late.
4 In this case, contract law
requires the seller to take reasonable measures to reduce, or mitigate, the damages that are owed to her
for early breach. Since these damages are decreasing in the probability of trading with an alternate
buyer, mitigation in this setting entails e￿orts to increase this probability of trading with the alternate
buyer. Section 5 endogenizes this probability of trading with an alternate buyer and compares the
private and social incentives for mitigation of damages. It is shown that unless the incumbent seller has
complete bargaining power vis-a-vis the alternate buyer, her private incentives for mitigation are socially
insu￿cient, leading to suboptimal mitigation e￿orts. However, this result crucially depends upon the
implicit assumption that breach is de￿ned as only a function of whether the incumbent buyer refuses
trade, or delivery of the good (as opposed to being also a function of whether the incumbent seller is
able to trade with an alternate buyer).
Next, I assume in Section 6 that the incumbent buyer and seller are able to renegotiate their original
contract after the arrival of each perfectly competitive entrant. It is shown that if the incumbent
seller has complete bargaining power with the alternate buyer (so that externalities are absent), socially
e￿cient breach and investment decisions can still be implemented with the same contract that induces
e￿cient decisions when renegotiation is not possible. Thus, this paper contributes to the literature on
contract breach by demonstrating that, absent externalities, e￿cient expectation damages are socially
optimal even if breach and renegotiation are possible at multiple points in time.
3See, for example, Chung (1992) and the references therein.
4For example, there may be insu￿cient time to ￿nd an alternate buyer if breach occurs late. The qualitative results would
continue hold if the probability of ￿nding an alternate buyer upon late breach is positive so long as it is less than the analogous
probability given early breach.
2Finally, Section 7 considers an application of the no-renegotiation version of the model to the lodging
industry, and in particular, vacation resorts’ policies regarding cancellation of lodging reservations. The
model predicts that a resort’s opportunity cost of honoring a reservation beyond the early cancellation
opportunity is increasing in the likelihood of ￿nding an alternate guest in case early cancellation occurs.
Therefore, we should expect the amount by which the late cancellation fee exceeds the early cancellation
fee to be larger during periods of high demand than during periods of low demand.
Section 8 brie￿y concludes.
2 A Model with Multiple Breach Opportunties
Consider a contract between a buyer and a seller to exchange one unit of an indivisible good or service.
The buyer’s value for the good, v; is commonly known to both parties.
5 The seller can make sequential
cost-reducing investments of r1 and r2 to improve her value from trade with the buyer. After the original
seller makes each investment ri, another seller observes her own production cost cEi and announces a
price pEi that she will charge the buyer if the buyer breaches his contract with the incumbent seller and
buys from her, the entrant seller, instead.
6 I study the case where the buyer has all the bargaining power
when dealing with the entrants, so that each entrant sets her price equal to her cost, pEi = cEi; and
behaves as if she were perfectly competitive.
7
The buyer has two opportunities to breach his contract with the incumbent seller: once after each
entrant seller arrives and announces pEi. The entrant’s price pEi and the incumbent’s investments
ri are observable by all parties but not veri￿able. For now, assume the incumbent seller and buyer
cannot renegotiate their contract after each entrant’s announcement of pEi (I examine the case where
renegotiation is possible in Section 6). So the model is essentially the stage game of Spier and Whinston
(1995) repeated twice, with perfectly competitive entrants and with the following additional modi￿cation.
I assume that if the original buyer breaches early, i.e., immediately after the ￿rst entrant sets her price,
then with probability ￿ the seller is able to ￿nd an alternate buyer who has the same value v for the good
and is charged a price p
0 by the seller. (Except for the discussion on mitigation of damages in Section 5,
I will assume throughout the rest of this paper that p
0 = v; so that the alternate buyer has no bargaining
power with respect to the incumbent seller.) If the original buyer breaches late, i.e., after the second
entrant announces her price, the seller cannot ￿nd an alternate buyer. For example, it may be the case
that the incumbent seller requires su￿cient time to have a chance of ￿nding an alternate buyer.
Because the buyer will have two opportunities to breach, the seller speci￿es in the contract two
liquidated damages, x1 and x2; where the buyer must pay xi to the seller if he cancels the contract
5Stole (1992) argues that when the parties are asymmetrically informed, liquidated damages not only provide incentives for
e￿cient breach, but also serve to e￿ciently screen among di￿erent types of buyers and sellers.
6Fixed costs of entry for the entrants are not explicitly modeled. Each of them simply observes her production cost and
then costlessly shows up to announce a price.
7If an entrant has some bargaining power with respect to the buyer, the damage for breach that the buyer must incur if he
were to buy from the entrant would still constrain the entrant’s price choice. Since the entrant would make positive pro￿ts if
she sells to the buyer in this case, the incumbent seller can use (socially excessive) stipulated breach damages to extract surplus
from the entrant. See Spier and Whinston (1995).
3after the seller has made her investment ri: If the buyer never breaches the contract and buys from
the incumbent seller, the only payment that he makes to the seller is a price p; which is paid when the
contract is performed in the last period (when the buyer accepts delivery of the good from the seller).
In this case, the seller’s investment costs are r1 + r2 and her production cost is c(r1;r2); where c(￿;￿) is
strictly decreasing and strictly convex in r1 and r2 for all (r1;r2) ￿ 0:
8 I will refer to r1 as the early
investment and r2 as the late investment. In the event that early breach occurs, r2 = 0:
To summarize, the sequence of events, shown in Figure 1 for the case when renegotiation is impossible,
is as follows.
t=0 Seller S o￿ers a contract (p;x1;x2) to Buyer B. If B rejects, both parties receive a payo￿ of zero
and the game ends. If B accepts, the game continues.
t=1.1 S makes a non-contractible early investment r1 ￿ 0 to reduce her production costs.
t=1.2 Nature draws Entrant seller E1’s cost cE1 from a distribution F(￿) with support [0;v]; and E1
chooses her price pE1:
t=1.3 B decides whether to breach early and buy from E1. The cost of the ￿rst investment, r1; is a
sunk cost for S at this point, but if B breaches early, S incurs production costs c(r1;0) only if she
￿nds an alternate buyer (which occurs with probability ￿). Therefore, payo￿s for the incumbent
buyer, incumbent seller, the ￿rst entrant, and the alternate buyer in the case of early breach are,
respectively,
uB = v ￿ pE1 ￿ x1; uS = x1 ￿ r1 + ￿ [p
0 ￿ c(r1;0)]; uE1 = pE1 ￿ cE1; uAB = ￿[v ￿ p
0]:
The game ends after an early breach. If B does not breach early, uE1 = uAB = 0 and the game
continues.
t=2.1 S makes a non-contractible, relationship-speci￿c late investment r2 ￿ 0 to further reduce her
production costs.
9
t=2.2 Nature draws Entrant seller E2’s cost cE2 from F(￿); independent of cE1; and E2 chooses her price
pE2:
10
t=2.3 B decides whether to breach late and buy from E2. Because I assume that S is unable to ￿nd an
alternate buyer if breach occurs late, payo￿s for the buyer, incumber seller, and second entrant in
the case of B breaching late are, respectively,
uB = v ￿ pE2 ￿ x2; uS = x2 ￿ r1 ￿ r2; uE2 = pE2 ￿ cE2:
If B does not breach, payo￿s are
uB = v ￿ p; uS = p ￿ c(r1;r2) ￿ r1 ￿ r2; uE2 = 0:
8While no functional form assumptions are made with respect to how the seller’s production costs depend on her investments,
it is assumed that these investments are sel￿sh in the sense that they do not directly a￿ect the buyer’s payo￿.
9The seller’s late investment r2 is relationship-speci￿c because it does not improve the her payo￿ at all if the incumbent
buyer breaches late. In contrast, S’s early investment r1 is not completely relationship-speci￿c because it reduces her cost of
selling to the alternative buyer, if one is found.
10The analysis would clearly be the same if we assumed that there is only one entrant who takes another independent draw

































Seller does not find
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uB = v – pE1 – x1
uS = x1 – r1 + p' – c(r1,0)
uE1 = pE1 – cE1
uAB = v – p'
Prob.
uB = v – pE2 – x2
uS = x2 – r1 – r2
uE2 = pE2 – cE2
uB = v – p
uS = p – c(r1,r2)
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uB = v – pE1 – x1
uS = x1 – r1
uE1 = pE1 – cE1
uAB = 0
Time =
Figure 1: Timeline and payo￿s when renegotiation is not possible.
3 E￿cient Investment and Breach
As a benchmark, I identify the investment and breach decisions that maximize expected social surplus,






1) denote the (ex-ante) e￿cient investments for the
seller.
Proceeding in reverse chronological order, I ￿rst characterize the buyer’s e￿cient late breach decision.
Assuming no early breach and investments r1 and r2; the social surplus (i.e., the sum of payo￿s for B, S,
and E2) is v ￿ cE2 ￿ r1 ￿ r2 if B breaches and v ￿ c(r1;r2) ￿ r1 ￿ r2 if B does not breach. Thus, given
investment levels r1 and r2 and no early breach, social surplus is maximized when B breaches late if and
only if potential entrant E2 can produce the good at a lower cost than the incumbent seller:
cE2 ￿ c(r1;r2): (1)
In particular, because all investment costs are sunk, they do not have any direct e￿ect on the e￿cient
late breach decision. However, investments indirectly a￿ect the late breach decision through their e￿ects
on the seller’s production costs.
Next, consider the seller’s e￿cient late investment, r
￿
2(r1); which by de￿nition maximizes expected
social surplus given early investment r1; no early breach, and late breach occurring if and only if cE2 ￿
c(r1;r2). In other words, r
￿









0 [v ￿ cE2 ￿ r1 ￿ r2]f(cE2)dcE2
+
R v
c(r1;r2)[v ￿ c(r1;r2) ￿ r1 ￿ r2]f(cE2)dcE2:
5The seller’s e￿cient late investment r
￿







This condition requires that, at its e￿cient level, the marginal cost of increasing r2 should equal the
expected marginal bene￿t of increasing r2; which is the cost reduction from increasing r2 multiplied by
the probability that the cost reduction will be realized (i.e., the probability of late breach not occurring,
conditional on early breach not occurring).
Now consider the e￿cient early breach decision. Social surplus from early breach is v ￿ cE1 ￿ r1 +
￿[v￿c(r1;0)]. Given that the late breach decision is e￿cient (follows (1)) and late investment is e￿cient
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is the expected continuation production cost given r1; and e￿cient late investment and e￿cient late
breach. So breaching early is e￿cient if and only if the ￿rst entrant’s cost, cE1; is lower than the
expected social cost of continuing with the incumbent seller, given e￿cient investments and e￿cient late
breach. In other words, in order for the buyer’s early breach decision to be e￿cient, his total expected
continuation cost must include not only his private expected continuation cost c
￿(r1); but also internalize
the additional investment cost r
￿
2(r1) that the seller will incur once early breach is foregone, as well as
the lost expected surplus ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)] that would have been realized had the seller been given the
opportunity to ￿nd an alternate buyer.
Finally, given the seller’s e￿cient late investment and the buyer’s e￿cient breach decisions as described
above, the seller’s e￿cient early investment, r
￿



























v ￿ r1 +
R c￿(r1)+r￿
2(r1)+￿[v￿c(r1;0)]











6In the ￿rst version of this problem, the two integrals represent the expected social surpluses when early
breach is e￿cient and when not breaching early is e￿cient, respectively. The seller’s e￿cient early
investment r
￿






































































































Equation (7) states that in order for early investment r
￿
1 to be e￿cient, its marginal cost must equal
its expected marginal bene￿t. When the buyer (e￿ciently) breaches early and an alternate buyer is







1) + ￿(v ￿ c(r
￿
1;0))]; the marginal bene￿t
of early investment r
￿
1 is a reduction of the seller’s production cost by the amount ￿c1(r
￿
1;0). When
















1))]g; the marginal bene￿t of early investment
r
￿






1)). Note that when ￿ = 0; so that





















where the right hand side is the reduction in production cost that results from investment r
￿
1; multiplied
by the probability that this bene￿t will actually be realized, i.e., the probability that breach never occurs.






1); are characterized by (6) and
(2), respectively. The buyer’s e￿cient breach decision is to breach early if and only if (3) is satis￿ed
and (conditional on not breaching early) to breach late if and only if (1) is satis￿ed.
4 Private Contracts Induce E￿cient Decisions
In this section, I show that if the incumbent parties’ original contract imposes no externalities on third
parties,
11 and if renegotiation is not possible, then the incumbent seller and buyer can implement the
e￿cient investment and breach decisions in both periods by stipulating e￿cient expectation damages.
This result has been demonstrated previously for the case of a single breach opportunity,
12 but not for
multiple breach opportunities.
11That is, assume both entrant sellers are perfectly competitive, i.e., constrained to set price equal to cost, and that the
incumbent seller has complete bargaining power with respect to the alternate buyer.
12See paragraph 4 on p. 186 of Spier and Whinston (1995) for references.
7Suppose the buyer and seller agreed to a contract (p;x1;x2) where










1) ￿ ￿[v ￿ c(r
￿
1;0)] (8)







Furthermore, assume each entrant Ei sets price equal to cost, pEi = cEi for i = 1;2; and that the
incumbent seller can charge the alternate buyer his value for the good, i.e., p
0 = v: The following
proposition states that this contract will induce the seller to invest e￿ciently and the buyer to make
the e￿cient breach decision in each period. Note that if a contract satis￿es (8) and (9), then whenever
the buyer breaches, the damages that he pays makes the seller as well o￿ as if the contract had been
performed, assuming the seller invested e￿ciently. Hence these damages are the e￿cient expectation
damages.
Proposition 2 Assume that entrants are perfectly competitive, the alternate buyer has no bargaining
power, and renegotiation is not possible. Then any contract (p;x1;x2) satisfying (8) and (9) induces the
seller to always invest e￿ciently and the buyer to always breach e￿ciently.
Proof. Using backwards induction to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game,
consider ￿rst B’s private incentives for late breach. Given a contract (p;x1;x2) that satis￿es (8) and
(9), suppose early breach did not occur. B’s equilibrium incentive is to breach late if and only if






1)). Thus, (1) implies that B’s late breach decision is











Given this late breach decision by B, an early investment of r
e
1 by S, and no early breach, (9) can be











































Then S’s equilibrium choice of r
e


























1: Hence, S’s late investment
is indeed e￿cient if her early investment is e￿cient.
Anticipating the late investment and breach decisions characterized above, B’s equilibrium incentive
is to breach early if and only if



























1 so that S’s early investment is e￿cient,
B’s early breach decision will be also e￿cient (as will be the late investment and late breach decisions).















1;0)]; the probability of early breach only depends on the e￿cient early investment r
￿
1 and not
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1;0))]g￿(r1);
where x1 ￿ r1 + ￿[p



























2(r1)) ￿ r1 ￿ r
e
2(r1)]f(cE2)dcE2
is the maximized value of the ￿rst problem in (10) when x1 and x2 are given by (8) and (9). That is,
￿(r1) is the continuation payo￿ for S from choosing early investment r1 when B does not breach early,
S’s chooses her late investment according to r
e







Note that ￿(r1) can be rewritten as





















1))]g ￿ r1 ￿ r
e
2(r1):
The ￿rst order condition for S’s equilibrium early investment r
e









































































































1)), and both of B’s breach decisions are e￿cient.
By Proposition 2, a contract satisfying (8) and (9) maximizes the joint expected payo￿s of the seller
and buyer. Therefore, such a contract must also maximize the seller’s ex-ante expected payo￿ given
that the buyer accepts the contract. Since the seller’s original contract proposal is a take-it-or-leave-it
o￿er, she will ￿nd it in her interest to o￿er a contract satisfying (8) and (9) and choose the price p so
that the buyer is just indi￿erent inbetween accepting or rejecting the contract o￿er.
Because the alternate buyer and each competitive entrant seller always earn a payo￿ of zero, a contract
satisfying (8) and (9) also maximizes social surplus. Therefore, assuming all of the assumptions of the
9model are satis￿ed, standard court-imposed breach remedies cannot improve welfare. Note that this
result crucially depends on the absence of externalities. When an entrant has market power (and the
buyer and seller are able to renegotiate after entry), Spier and Whinston (1995) show in a one-period
model that \privately stipulated damages are set at a socially excessive level to facilitate the extraction
of the entrant’s surplus." Presumably, this ine￿ciency result would continue to hold if entrants have
market power and renegotiation is introduced into the above two-period framework.
Note that the intuition behind Proposition 2 can also be seen without resorting to ￿rst order con-
ditions. Because the original contract imposes no externalities, the incumbent seller’s investments are
always e￿cient given the incumbent buyer’s breach decisions. Therefore, since e￿cient expectation
damages induce the buyer to make breach decisions that are e￿cient assuming the seller’s investments
are ex-ante e￿cient,
13 such damages will also induce the seller to make (ex-ante) e￿cient investment
decisions.
Subtracting equation (8) from (9), the following observations are evident.
Corollary 3 When the entrants are perfectly competitive, the breach damages is higher after the second
investment has been made than before the second investment has been made:












(x2 ￿ x1) = v ￿ c(r
￿
1;0) > 0:
The ￿rst part of this corollary says that the fee for cancelling the contract increases over time. The




1) + ￿[v ￿ c(r
￿
1;0)] between the damages for late and early breach illustrates





1) and forgo an expected surplus of ￿[v ￿ c(r
￿
1;0)] from possible trade with an alternate
buyer. Therefore, the penalty for late breach must include the additional cost of the seller’s second
investment, as well as the lost expected surplus from potential trade with an alternate buyer, in order
to induce the buyer to internalize these social opportunity costs of continuing with the contract when
making his second breach decision.
Because the opportunity cost ￿[v ￿ c(r
￿
1;0)] of continuing with the contract is increasing in the
probability of ￿nding an alternate buyer in case of early breach, the second part of the corollary simply
points out the fact that the di￿erence in the penalties between late breach and early breach must also
be increasing in this probability.
13To see why this is so with sequential breach decisions, ￿rst note that with e￿cient second period investment, the e￿cient
expectation damage for late breach will induce the buyer to make his late breach decision e￿ciently. Thus, given e￿cient
￿rst period investment, the e￿cient expectation damage for early breach will also cause the buyer to make his early early
breach decision e￿ciently (since his continuation payo￿ from not breaching early is based on e￿cient second period breach and
investment decisions). This reasoning should also apply to the case in which there are N > 2 periods in which breach may
occur.
14This assumes that trade with the alternate buyer is e￿cient, conditional on e￿cient early investment.
105 Mitigation of Damages
Corollary 3 shows that the amount by which the damages for late breach exceed the damages for early
breach is increasing in ￿; the probability of ￿nding an alternate buyer. While so far it has been assumed
that this probability is exogenous, in reality the incumbent seller frequently has some in￿uence over
the likelihood of recouping some of her initial investment, and therefore the damages owed her by the
incumbent buyer. When this is the case, contract law stipulates that the seller (i.e., the breached-against
party, or promisee) has the responsibility of undertaking (a reasonable amount of) e￿ort to reduce, or
mitigate, those damages.
15
Mitigation usually involves e￿ort costs or other opportunity costs, so I modify the previous model
by introducing a cost of mitigation for the seller. I demonstrate that the seller’s incentive to engage
in such mitigation e￿orts is socially e￿cient only when she has complete bargaining power vis-a-vis the
alternate buyer; otherwise, her mitigation e￿ort is socially insu￿cient.
5.1 Binary Mitigation Decision
First I consider the case where the seller simply makes a binary decision (immediately after early breach
occurs) regarding whether or not to mitigate the damages owed to her by the incumbent buyer. Choos-
ing to mitigate implies, as before, encountering an alternate buyer with (￿xed) probability ￿; and not
mitigating implies being unable to ￿nd an alternate buyer with certainty. Assume mitigation involves a
disutility of ￿ > 0 for the incumbent seller.
Suppose that the incumbent seller’s early investment is r1 and that early breach has occurred. The
seller’s payo￿ from not mitigating is x1￿r1; and her payo￿ from mitigating is x1￿r1+￿[p
0￿c(r1;0)]￿￿;
where recall p
0 is the price paid by the alternate buyer. Therefore, if there is no legal requirements on
the seller’s mitigation decision, she will choose to mitigate if and only if
￿[p
0 ￿ c(r1;0)] > ￿:
That is, e￿ort is expended to search for an alternate buyer when the probability of, or gains from, trade
with such a buyer is high, or when the search e￿ort associated with mitigation is not too costly.
How does this compare with the socially e￿cient mitigation decision? The payo￿s of the incumbent
buyer and the ￿rst entrant seller are independent of whether the incumbent seller mitigates, so they do
not in￿uence the socially e￿cient mitigation decision. Summing the payo￿s of the incumbent seller and
the alternate buyer, it is straightforward to see that social surplus is maximized with the incumbent
seller mitigating if and only if
￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)] > ￿:
15According to Restatement (Second) of Contracts, x350 (p. 127), \As a general rule, a party cannot recover damages for loss
that he could have avoided by reasonable e￿orts." Goetz and Scott (1983) provide a detailed discussion of the general theory
of mitigation. Miceli, et al. (2001) consider a speci￿c application to property leases with court imposed damages. They show
that whether it is optimal for there to be a duty for the landlord to mitigate damages from tenant breach of contract depends
on whether leases fall under the domain of contract law or property law.
11By comparing the above two inequalities, it can be readily observed that the incumbent seller’s private
incentives for mitigation of damages is socially insu￿cient unless p
0 = v; in which case she has complete
bargaining power when dealing with the alternate buyer.
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5.2 Continuous Mitigation Decision
Now consider the more general case where the seller’s mitigation e￿ort choice is continuous. Without
loss of generality, suppose that the seller directly chooses the probability of ￿nding an alternate buyer,
￿ 2 [0;1]. In doing so, she incurs an e￿ort cost of ￿(￿); where ￿(￿) is strictly increasing and strictly
convex in ￿; with ￿(0) = 0:
Given early investment r1 by the incumbent seller, and early breach by the incumbent buyer, the
seller chooses her mitigation e￿ort level ￿ to maximize her expected payo￿:
max
￿2[0;1]
fx1 ￿ r1 + ￿[p
0 ￿ c(r1;0)] ￿ ￿(￿)g:
Assuming p
0 ￿ c(r1;0) > ￿
0(0); the ￿rst order condition characterizing the interior solution is
p




e(r1) represents the incumbent seller’s equilibrium choice of mitigation e￿ort. This expression
simply states that the privately optimal mitigation e￿ort level equates the marginal private bene￿t of
increasing such e￿ort with the marginal cost.
In contrast, the socially e￿cient mitigation e￿ort level ￿
￿(r1) satis￿es
v ￿ c(r1;0) = ￿
0(￿
￿(r1))
because the marginal social bene￿t from increasing the probability of trade with an alternate buyer is the
total surplus from such trade, or v￿c(r1). Since this marginal social bene￿t exceeds the marginal private
bene￿t whenever v > p
0; or whenever the alternate buyer has some bargaining power, the incumbent
seller will tend to choose a socially insu￿cient mitigation e￿ort level (due to the convexity of her e￿ort
costs ￿(￿)): ￿
e(r1) ￿ ￿
￿(r1) for all r1; with equality if and only if v = p
0:
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5.3 Contractibility of the Mitigation Decision
Regardless of whether the mitigation choice involves a binary or continuous decision variable, the incum-
bent buyer usually exerts a socially insu￿cient amount of e￿ort to mitigate breach damages, and her
mitigation decision is socially e￿cient if and only if she is able to capture all of the gains from trade with
the alternate buyer. The intuition for this ine￿ciency result is analogous to the intuition for ine￿cient
(under-)investment in property rights models with separate ownership: here, unless the seller is able to
charge the alternate buyer a price equal to the latter’s willingness to pay for the good or service, she (the
seller) does not appropriate all of the surplus from trade and therefore has ine￿ciently weak incentives
for mitigation. (Recall that the seller always bears all of the mitigation costs.)
16When p0 = v; the social e￿ciency of the incumbent seller’s mitigation decision follows immediately from the observation
that her decision to mitigation can be viewed as an example of a sel￿sh investment.
17The same intuition as in footnote 16 above applies here as well.
12Notice that the above analysis assumes the damages for early breach, x1; is ￿xed and una￿ected by
the mitigation choice. This requires an implicit assumption that while the incumbent seller is able to
commit to her choices of damages, she is unable to commit to her mitigation decision when the contract
is ￿rst signed. This assumption is reasonable to the extent that mitigation e￿ort cannot be contracted
upon at the start of the game, and it seems justi￿ed as least in the model where the mitigation decision
is continuous and assumed to be equivalent to the probability of ￿nding an alternate buyer. In such
an environment, it is di￿cult to conceive how the contracting parties may verify to a court the actual
mitigation e￿ort level, since it is possible that an alternate buyer is found ex-post even though the
incumbent seller may have chosen a very small, but positive, mitigation e￿ort level ex-ante. This case
would be relevant, for example, when the mitigation e￿ort decision is not publicly observable.
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On the other hand, if the mitigation decision is binary, and there really is no chance of ￿nding an
alternate buyer upon late breach, it is conceivable that the mitigation decision might be veri￿able ex-post
and hence contractible ex-ante.
19 The reason is that if, upon early breach, an alternate buyer is indeed
found and trade occurs, then the incumbent seller necessarily chose to mitigate damages. However,
this logic depends on the assumption that trade with the alternate buyer is verifable. Were this not
the case, the incumbent seller would have an incentive to frabricate evidence of trade with an alternate
buyer. Nevertheless, this issue is not problematic to the extent that (i) trade with the incumbent buyer
is veri￿able, so that the original contract is enforable; and (ii) veri￿ability of trade for the incumbent
seller is correlated among buyers.
If the parties truly cannot contract upon the mitigation decision ex-ante, the incumbent seller would
no longer have any contractual obligations towards the incumbent buyer once breach has occurred. She
would then be free, in the event of early breach, to choose her mitigation decision in any manner she sees
￿t. In light of this consideration, the legal requirement that breached-against parties take reasonable
e￿orts to mitigate their damages in the event of breach can be viewed as an attempt to ameliorate the
social insu￿ciency of private mitigation incentives when contracts are incomplete.
20
5.4 The Nature of the Breach Outcome
There is one ￿nal observation to make regarding the e￿ciency of the incumbent seller’s mitigation e￿ort.
Assuming that she has full bargaining power vis-a-vis the alternate buyer, the preceeding analysis shows
that the incumbent seller has socially e￿cient incentives for mitigation. This result relies on the implicit
assumption that whether the contract is breached directly depends upon only the incumbent buyer’s
action and not the action of the incumbent seller. If whether breach occurs is a function of both party’s
18If the mitigation e￿ort decision is publicly observable, the question then becomes whether mitigation should be viewed as
the mere exertion of e￿ort to search for an alternate buyer, or actual discovery of such an opportunity and the consumation of
trade with the alternate buyer.
19It would be interesting to analyze whether the incumbent seller has private incentives to write a contract that induces socially
e￿cient mitigation e￿ort when this decision is veri￿able and included as a part of the original contract. If the incumbent seller
has complete bargaining power with respect to both the incumbent and alternate buyers, it may be reasonable to expect that
private mitigation e￿orts will be socially e￿cient.
20See Goetz and Scott (1983).
13actions (as is the case in some tort models), the following analysis will show that the incumbent seller’s
action (mitigation decision) may be socially ine￿cient, even if she has full bargaining power with respect
to the alternate buyer.
The duty to mitigate damages usually arises in situations where breach damages are imposed ex-
post by the court, as opposed to being privately stipulated ex-ante. Therefore, to see the importance
of the way in which breach is de￿ned, consider the following example, where I assume court-imposed
expectation damages.
Suppose there is just one period, with no investment, buyer value v; seller cost c; and a binary









E ￿ v+￿[v￿c]￿￿; where ￿ is the seller’s e￿ort cost of mitigation. In particular, if she mitigates
upon breach, there is probability ￿ that she will be able to ￿nd an alternate buyer with whom to trade
at the price p
0 = v and cost c: If the incumbent seller does not mitigate after breach, there is zero
probability ￿nding an alternate buyer.
First, suppose breach of contract is de￿ned simply as the buyer’s refusal to trade with the incumbent
seller. As the previous subsection showed, the seller’s mitigation decision will be e￿cient because upon
breach, she receives all the expected surplus from trade with the alternate buyer and therefore will decide
to mitigate if and only if ￿[v ￿ c] ￿ ￿ > 0, as required by e￿ciency.
Now suppose breach of contract is said to occur (and hence breach damages x due) if and only if the
incumbent buyer refuses trade and the incumbent seller cannot ￿nd an alternate buyer.
21 Conditional
on the incumbent buyer’s refusal of trade, e￿ciency requires that the seller mitigates, i.e., exerts e￿ort
to ￿nd an alternate buyer, if and only if v ￿ cE + ￿[v ￿ c] ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 () cE ￿ v + ￿[v ￿ c] ￿ ￿:
22
Since cE ￿ c
H
E ￿ v + ￿[v ￿ c] ￿ ￿ by assumption, the e￿cient mitigation decision is to always mitigate
(conditional on the incumbent buyer’s refusal of trade). However, the seller will never exert mitigation
e￿ort. To see this, note that if she does not mitigate, then with probability 1 she does not ￿nd an
alternate buyer to trade with, and hence by de￿nition breach occurs. So the seller’s payo￿ from not
mitigating, given expectation damages, is x = p
0 ￿ c = v ￿ c:
23 The seller’s payo￿ from mitigation is
￿[v ￿c]+(1￿￿)x￿￿ = v ￿c￿￿; which is less than her payo￿ of v ￿c from not mitigating.
24;25 Thus,
21Because the seller’s mitigation decision a￿ects her probability of ￿nding an alternate buyer, it also a￿ects the probability
that breach is said to occur.
22If S does not mitigate after B refuses trade, no surplus is realized because S would not be able to trade with either B or
the alternate buyer.
23The expectation damage equates the seller’s payo￿ from breach, x; to her payo￿ from no breach. Conditional on the
incumbent buyer’s refusal to trade, no breach corresponds to the case in which the seller is able to ￿nd an alternate buyer with
whom to trade. In this case, the seller receives a payo￿ of p0 ￿ c = v ￿ c:
24With probability ￿; the seller ￿nds and trades with an alternate buyer. In this case, there is no breach and the seller
receives v ￿ c from trade with the alternate buyer. With probability 1 ￿ ￿; the seller is unable to ￿nd an alternate buyer, and
so by de￿nition breach occurs. The seller receives the breach damage x in this case. Regardless of whether an alternate buyer
is found, the seller incurs the e￿ort cost ￿ if she mitigates.
25Note that if the expectation damages were to compensate the seller for her disutility of mitigation e￿ort, then x = v￿c+￿:
In this case, the seller’s payo￿ from mitigation is ￿[v ￿ c] + (1 ￿ ￿)x ￿ ￿ = v ￿ c + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿ = v ￿ c ￿ ￿￿; which is still less
than her payo￿ of v ￿ c from not mitigating. Therefore, as long as the court-imposed expectation damage does not grossly
over-estimate the seller’s disutility of mitigation, she will still prefer to not mitigate.
14the seller will never choose to mitigate even though it is e￿cient for her to do so after the buyer’s refusal
to trade.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. When breach is equivalent to the incumbent buyer’s
refusal to trade, the seller’s mitigation decision does not a￿ect the incumbent buyer’s payo￿ conditional
on his refusal to trade. Instead, the mitigation decision only a￿ects the seller’s own payo￿ (recall the
alternate buyer always earns zero by assumption), and so her mitigation decision will be e￿cient. In
contrast, if the de￿nition of breach requires not only the buyer’s refusal to trade but also the seller’s
inability to ￿nd an alternate buyer, then the seller will not mitigate even when it is e￿cient to do so. To
see this, note that expectation damages ensure that regardless of whether the seller mitigates, she will
receive the same gross payo￿ (excluding any mitigation e￿ort costs) of v ￿ c after the incumbent buyer
refuses to trade. Therefore, because mitigation e￿ort is costly, the seller will choose to not mitigate.
26
(This ine￿ciency result still obtains even if the seller is accurately compensated for her disutility of
mitigation e￿ort when no alternate buyer is found. The reason is that while the cost of mitigation is
certain, ￿nding an alternate buyer is not. See footnote 25.)
6 Renegotiation
I now examine the situation where the incumbent seller S and buyer B are able to renegotiate their
original contract after each entrant seller announces its price pEi and prior to each breach opportunity.
Once again, assume each entrant is perfectly competitive and sets price equal to cost, pEi = cEi; and
suppose that S has complete bargaining power vis-a-vis the alternate buyer. Then S and B’s contract
imposes no externalities on other parties, and so they have joint incentives to induce e￿cient breach and
investment decisions. As Proposition 4 below demonstrates, the e￿cient breach and investment decisions
can in fact be implemented with the same e￿cient expectation damages as before, when renegotiation
was impossible. The logic underlying this argument depends crucially on analyzing the parties’ payo￿s
o￿ the equilibrium path.
Assume Nash bargaining during each renegotation period, so that the renegotiation outcome maxi-
mizes the seller and buyer’s joint payo￿s. The renegotiation surplus, which is split between S and B
in the proportions ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿; is de￿ned as the di￿erence in the sum of payo￿s for S and B with and
without renegotiation: sreneg ￿ (uS + uB)jw=reneg ￿ (uS + uB)jw=o reneg: Hence, the payo￿s after each
stage of renegotiation are uSjw=o reneg + ￿ ￿ sreneg for the seller and uBjw=o reneg + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ sreneg for
the buyer. If B is indi￿erent between buying from an entrant or S, assume B buys from the entrant,
regardless of whether the indi￿erence arises before or after renegotiation.
Suppose that early and late investment are complementary, i.e.,
c12(r1;r2) ￿ 0 for all (r1;r2): (14)
Then S’s privately optimal, or equilibrium, late investment r
e
2(r1) is increasing in her early investment
26Alternatively, the intuition for the ine￿ciency result follows from the observation that when breach depends on both parties’
actions, the incubment seller’s mitigation decision has an externality on the incumbent seller (even though p0 = v implies no










1))]g ￿ ￿ for all r1; (15)
which can be shown to imply that: (i) when r1 is less than r
￿
1; the private value of early investment for
S exceeds its social value assuming early breach occurs; and (ii) when r1 is greater than r
￿
1; the private
value of early investment for S is less than its social value assuming early breach does not occur.
Proposition 4 Suppose S and B can renegotiate after each competitive entrant arrives and that (14) and
(15) are satis￿ed. Then the ex-ante e￿cient breach and investment decisions (as characterized in Section
3) can be implemented by the same contract that implements the e￿cient outcome when renegotiation
is not possible, i.e., any contract (p;x1;x2) where x1 and x2 are the e￿￿cient expectation damages and
satisfy (8) and (9).
The intuition for this result is as follows. When r1 < r
￿
1; early renegotiation causes early breach to
occur (but not absent early renegotiation) for intermediate realizations of the early entrant’s cost. In
this case, S’s private incentive to increase r1 slightly exceeds the social marginal bene￿t of increasing r1:
(To see this, suppose no alternate buyer exists. Then a social planner would not value early investment
at all given that early breach occurs. However, S obtains a share of the early renegotiation surplus,
which is increasing in S’s early investment.
27) Similarly, when r1 > r
￿
1; early renegotiation causes early
breach to not occur (but it does occur absent early renegotiation) for intermediate realizations of the
early entrant’s cost. Here, assumption (15) implies that S has a smaller private incentive to increase
r1 relative to the social marginal bene￿t. Together, these two observations will induce S to choose the
e￿cient early investment r
￿
1:
Given that S chooses the e￿cient early investment r
￿
1; early renegotiation implies that B’s early
breach decision will be (ex-ante) e￿cient as well. It can also be shown that S’s privately optimal late
investment, r
e
2(r1); coincides with the e￿cient late investment r
￿
2(r1) when r1 = r
￿
1: In other words, given
that S’s early investment is e￿cient, so is her late investment (see Lemma 6 below). Late renegotiation
then leads to the e￿cient late breach decision. (These observations also imply that no renegotiation
occurs on the equilibrium path.)
The rest of this section details the proof of this proposition.
28 Using backwards induction, I ￿rst
look at B’s late breach decision, then S’s late investment decision, then B’s early breach decision, and
￿nally S’s early investment decision.
6.1 Late Breach Decision
First consider B’s late breach decision. Given there is no early breach and that x2 satis￿es (9), B has a
private incentive to breach late absent renegotiation if and only if v ￿ cE2 ￿ x2 ￿ v ￿ p; i.e.







27If trade with an alternate buyer is possible and r1 < r￿
1; assumption (15) implies that S’s private marginal bene￿t from
increasing early investment continues to exceed the social marginal bene￿t, given that early breach occurs.
28Readers who are either uninterested in the technical details underlying Proposition 4 or more interested in a concrete
application of this model may wish to skip ahead to Section 7.
16On the other hand, conditional on S having actually chosen investment levels r1 and r2; renegotiation
after the second entrant arrives (what I will sometimes refer to as \late renegotiation") leads to late
breach if and only if v ￿ cE2 ￿ v ￿ c(r1;r2); i.e.,
cE2 ￿ c(r1;r2):
Given (r1;r2); this is the ex-post e￿cient breach decision. Since ex-ante e￿ciency requires late breach to






1)); late renegotiation implies that B’s late breach decision is ex-ante







6.2 Renegotiation Payo￿s in the Second Period
Before examining S’s late investment decision, we must ￿rst consider the (renegotiation-induced) payo￿s
of S (and B) for all possible realizations of the second entrant’s price/cost cE2; as well as for all possible
early and late investments (r1;r2) that S might make (including those o￿ the equilibrium path).
When cE2 ￿ minfp￿x2;c(r1;r2)g; B breaches late regardless of whether late renegotiation is possible,
and so payo￿s are uS = x2 ￿ r1 ￿ r2 and uB = v ￿ cE2 ￿ x2: On the other hand, when cE2 >
maxfp￿x2;c(r1;r2)g; B does not breach late regardless of whether late renegotiation is possible, and so
payo￿s are uS = p ￿ c(r1;r2) ￿ r1 ￿ r2 and uB = v ￿ p:
If p ￿ x2 < cE2 ￿ c(r1;r2); B does not breach late absent late renegotiation because p ￿ x2 < cE2:
But since the second entrant can produce the good at a lower cost than S in this case, renegotiation
will induce B to breach and allow the parties to share the renegotiation surplus c(r1;r2) ￿ cE2 ￿ 0:
Disagreement payo￿s are those associated with the no-breach outcome, i.e., p ￿ c(r1;r2) ￿ r1 ￿ r2 for S
and v ￿ p for B, and so the renegotiation payo￿s are uS = p ￿ c(r1;r2) ￿ r1 ￿ r2 + ￿[c(r1;r2) ￿ cE2] and
uB = v ￿ p + (1 ￿ ￿)[c(r1;r2) ￿ cE2]:
On the other hand, if c(r1;r2) < cE2 ￿ p ￿ x2; B breaches late absent late renegotiation because
cE2 ￿ p ￿ x2: But late renegotiation will cause B to not breach and allow the parties to share the
renegotiation surplus cE2 ￿ c(r1;r2) > 0 (in this case, S has the lower cost). Disagreement payo￿s are
therefore those associated with the breach outcome, i.e., x2￿r1￿r2 for S and v￿cE2￿x2 for B, and so the
renegotiation payo￿s are uS = x2￿r1￿r2+￿[cE2￿c(r1;r2)] and uB = v￿cE2￿x2+(1￿￿)[cE2￿c(r1;r2)]:
To summarize:
Lemma 5 If early breach does not occur and S’s investments are (r1;r2); payo￿s after late renegotiation
(excluding investment costs) for the incumbent seller S and buyer B, respectively, are given by:
fx2;v ￿ cE2 ￿ x2g if cE2 ￿ minfp ￿ x2;c(r1;r2)g;
fp ￿ c(r1;r2);v ￿ pg if cE2 > maxfp ￿ x2;c(r1;r2)g; 8
<
:
p ￿ c(r1;r2) + ￿[c(r1;r2) ￿ cE2];








x2 + ￿[cE2 ￿ c(r1;r2)];




if c(r1;r2) < cE2 ￿ p ￿ x2:
17uS = x2 – r2
Realizations
of cE2:
p – x2 0 v c(r1,r2)
uS = p – c(r1,r2)– r2
Absent late renegotiation,







uS = p – c(r1,r2)– r2 + [c(r1,r2) – cE2] a
Figure 2: Seller S’s ex-post payo￿s after late renegotiation, for the case when p ￿ x2 ￿ c(r1;r2):











uS = x2 – r2 uS = p – c(r1,r2)– r2 uS = x2 – r2 +   [cE2 – c(r1,r2)] a
Figure 3: Seller S’s ex-post payo￿s after late renegotiation, for the case when p ￿ x2 ￿ c(r1;r2):
6.3 Late Investment Decision
Now consider S’s late investment decision given that she chose r1 in period 1. First, suppose S chooses
r2 such that p ￿ x2 ￿ c(r1;r2): Conditional on early breach not occurring, Figure 2 summarizes S’s
ex-post payo￿ after late renegotiation (from Lemma 5) as a function of the second entrant’s price o￿er
pE2 = cE2:
In this case, S’s expected payo￿ (exclusive of her early investment cost) is
￿L(r1;r2) = F[p ￿ x2]x2 +
Z c(r1r2)
p￿x2
fp ￿ c(r1;r2) + ￿[c(r1;r2) ￿ cE1]gf(cE1)dcE1
+(1 ￿ F[c(r1;r2)])[p ￿ c(r1;r2)] ￿ r2:
On the other hand, if S chooses r2 such that p ￿ x2 ￿ c(r1;r2); Figure 3 depicts her ex-post payo￿
after late renegotiation as a function of the second entrant’s price.
For these values of r1 and r2; S’s expected payo￿ (exclusive of early investment cost) is
￿H(r1;r2) = F[c(r1;r2)]x2 +
Z p￿x2
c(r1r2)
fx2 + ￿[cE1 ￿ c(r1;r2)]gf(cE1)dcE1
+(1 ￿ F[p ￿ x2])[p ￿ c(r1;r2)] ￿ r2:
Note that ￿H(r1;r2) can be rewritten as




+(1 ￿ F[p ￿ x2])[p ￿ c(r1;r2)] ￿ r2
= ￿L(r1;r2);
18where the second inequality follows from (i) switching the bounds of integration in the second term and
multiplying the integrand by ￿1; and (ii) writing 1 ￿ F[p ￿ x2] in the third term as (1 ￿ F[c(r1;r2)]) +
(F[c(r1;r2)] ￿ F[p ￿ x2]) and then rearranging. Thus, given r1; simply denote S’s expected payo￿ from
chosing r2 (exclusive of early investment cost) by
￿(r1;r2) ￿ ￿L(r1;r2) = ￿H(r1;r2) for all (r1;r2):
Let r
e
2(r1) denote S’s privately optimal, or equilibrium, late investment choice, given that her early
investment is r1: It is characterized by the ￿rst order condition
0 = ￿2(r1;r
e





2(r1))] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)F[p ￿ x2]g ￿ 1









































































This result is analogous to Proposition 1 in Spier and Whinston (1995), where e￿cient expectation
damages lead the seller to invest e￿ciently. (As in their Proposition 1, I also assume renegotiation
and a perfectly competitive (late) entrant.) The intuition is the same as well. When the seller’s late
investment is less than e￿cient (given r
￿
1), late renegotiation allows her to capture a share of the return
on her cost reduction for realizations of cE2 that ultimately lead to late breach (see the middle interval
in Figure 2). Since a social planner only values late investment when S actually produces the good,
the seller’s incentive to increase her late investment exceeds that of a social planner when r2 is less than
e￿cient (given r
￿
1). Similarly, when r2 is more than e￿cient (given r
￿
1), the seller’s incentive to increase
her late investment is less than that of a social planner. Hence, the seller chooses the e￿cient late
investment (given early investment r
￿
1).
Finally, assuming the second order condition is satis￿ed, (14) implies that r
e
2(r1) is increasing in r1:
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2(r1)) < 0: Therefore Lemma 6 implies that
r1 Q r
￿









with equality if and only if r1 = r
￿
1:
6.4 Early Breach Decision
Absent Early Renegotiation.




1))]g + c2(r1;r2)2f[c(r1;r2)] < 0 at r2 = re
2(r1) for all r1: Given (14), ￿21 = ￿c21f1 ￿ ￿F[c] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)F[p ￿
x2]g + ￿c1c2f(c) > 0; and so re0
2 (r1) = ￿￿21=￿22 > 0 at (r1;re
2(r1)):
19Absent early renegotiation, the incumbent buyer B obtains a payo￿ of v ￿ cE1 ￿ x1 if he breaches
early to buy from the ￿rst entrant. Now consider B’s expected payo￿ from not breaching early, with
late renegotiation still possible.





1; which is equivalent to p￿x2 ￿ c(r1;r
e
2(r1)) by (17). Lemma 5 and (9) imply that B’s expected
payo￿ from not breaching early is
Z p￿x2
0







(v ￿ p + (1 ￿ ￿)[c(r1;r
e
2(r1)) ￿ cE2])f(cE2)dcE2






























1))f(cE2)dcE2 (recall (4), the de￿nition
of c
￿(r1)), B’s expected payo￿ from not early early can be further rewritten as v ￿  (r1) ￿ x2; where













If r1 ￿ r
￿
1 instead, i.e., p ￿ x2 ￿ c(r1;r
e









(v ￿ cE2 ￿ x2 + (1 ￿ ￿)[cE2 ￿ c(r1;r
e
2(r1))])f(cE2)dcE2:
It turns out that this expression can also be written as v ￿  (r1) ￿ x2:
So for any r1; B breaches early absent early renegotiation if and only if v￿cE1 ￿x1 ￿ v￿ (r1)￿x2;
or equivalently,
cE1 ￿  (r1) + x2 ￿ x1: (18)
Since  











2(r1))]); (17) implies that
 
0(r1) T 0 for all r1 S r
￿
1; (19)








1) follows from Lemma 6. So if S’s early investment is e￿cient, (8) and
(9) imply that B will breach early absent early renegotiation if and only if cE1 ￿  (r
￿








1) + ￿[v ￿ c(r
￿
1;0)]; which is the e￿cient early breach decision.
With Early Renegotiation.
With early renegotiation, B will breach early to buy from the ￿rst entrant if and only if expected social
surplus is higher from his breaching early. Absent early breach, surplus is uS + uB = v ￿  (r1) ￿ x2 +
￿(r1;r
e
2(r1))￿r1: With early breach, uS +uB = v ￿cE1 +￿[v ￿c(r1;0)]￿r1: Thus, early renegotiation
leads to early breach if and only if
cE1 ￿ ￿(r1) + ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)]; (20)
where ￿(r1) ￿  (r1) + x2 ￿ ￿(r1;r
e
2(r1));
20(which is the e￿cient breach decision given r1).





2(r1) + ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)] (21)
(compare with (3) for the case r1 = r
￿
1). It can be veri￿ed that c
￿(r1) + r
￿
2(r1) and ￿(r1); and hence
the right hand sides of (20) and (21), are not equal unless r1 = r
￿
1: Therefore, the e￿cient early breach
decisions when renegotiation is and is not possible do not coincide with each other unless S’s early
investment is e￿cient. In other words, the possibility of renegotiation does not alter the e￿cient early
breach decision on the equilibrium path but does a￿ect it o￿ the equilibrium path.
Since B’s early breach decision (with early renegotiation) is ex-ante e￿cient given r
￿
1; it remains to
show that S’s early investment is indeed e￿cient.
6.5 Renegotiation Payo￿s in the First Period
Before analyzing S’s early investment decision, we ￿rst derive the payo￿s of S (and B) after early renego-
tiation for all possible realizations of the ￿rst entrant’s price/cost cE1 and all levels of S’s early investment
r1: Recall that absent early renegotiation, B breaches early if and only if (18) holds, while with early
renegotiation early breach occurs if and only if (20) is satis￿ed.
When cE1 ￿ minf (r1)+x2￿x1;￿(r1)+￿[v￿c(r1;0)]g; B breaches early regardless of whether early
renegotiation is possible, and so payo￿s are uS = x1 +￿[v ￿c(r1;0)]￿r1 and uB = v ￿cE1 ￿x1: On the
other hand, when cE2 > maxf (r1)+x2￿x1;￿(r1)+￿[v￿c(r1;0)]g; B does not breach early regardless of
whether early renegotiation is possible, and so payo￿s are uS = ￿(r1;r
e
2(r1))￿r1 and uB = v￿ (r1)￿x2:
If  (r1) + x2 ￿ x1 < cE1 ￿ ￿(r1) + ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)]; B does not breach early absent early renegotiation
because  (r1)+x2￿x1 < cE1: But early renegotiation induces B to breach early and allow the parties to
share the renegotiation surplus s
L
reneg ￿ ￿(r1)+￿[v￿c(r1;0)]￿cE1 ￿ 0: Disagreement payo￿s are those
associated with the no-early-breach outcome, i.e., ￿(r1;r
e
2(r1))￿r1 for S and v￿ (r1)￿x2 for B, and so




reneg and uB = v￿ (r1)￿x2+(1￿￿)￿s
L
reneg:
If ￿(r1)+￿[v ￿c(r1;0)] < cE1 ￿  (r1)+x2 ￿x1; B breaches early absent early renegotiation because
cE1 ￿  (r1) + x2 ￿ x1: However, early renegotiation induces B to not breach early and allow the
parties to share the renegotiation surplus s
H
reneg ￿ cE1 ￿ ￿(r1) ￿ ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)] ￿ 0: Disagreement
payo￿s are those associated with the early breach outcome, i.e., x1 + ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)] ￿ r1 for S and
uB = v ￿ cE1 ￿ x1 for B, and so the renegotiation payo￿s are uS = x1 + ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)] ￿ r1 + ￿ ￿ s
H
reneg




Lemma 7 If S’s early investment is r1; the expected payo￿s after early renegotiation (excluding early
21investment costs) for S and B, respectively, are given by:




 (r1) + x2 ￿ x1;











 (r1) + x2 ￿ x1;










2(r1)) + ￿ ￿ s
L
reneg;










x1 + ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)] + ￿ ￿ s
H
reneg;











reneg ￿ ￿(r1) + ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)] ￿ cE1:
6.6 Early Investment Decision
Given the preceeding analysis, to prove Proposition 4 it su￿ces to show that S’s privately optimal early
investment is indeed at the e￿cient level r
￿
1: De￿ne ￿(r1) to be S’s ex-ante expected payo￿s from
choosing r1: Recall that ex-ante expected social welfare given r1 is denoted by S(r1) and, by de￿nition,
is maximized at r
￿
1: We will show that
￿
0(r1) ￿ S





0(r1) ￿ 0;8r1 ￿ r
￿
1:
It will then follow that S’s privately optimal early investment (the value of r1 that maximizes ￿(r1)) is
indeed the e￿cient one, r
￿
1: (Note that similar to the proof of Lemma 6 above, this part of the proof
of Proposition 4 also follows the strategy of the proof of Proposition 1 in Spier and Whinston (1995).
The complicating factor in this model is that because there is a second period if early breach does not
occur, one must replace the (￿nal) renegotiation payo￿s derived in Spier and Whinston’s Lemma 1 with
the (interim) renegotiation payo￿s given by Lemma 7 above.)
First of all, observe that given assumption (15),
r1 S r
￿
1 ()  (r1) + x2 ￿ x1 S ￿(r1) + ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)];
with equality only at r1 = r
￿
1: To see this, note that  (r1)+x2￿x1 S ￿(r1)+￿[v￿c(r1;0)] is equivalent
to
0 S ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)] + x1 ￿ ￿(r1;r
e
2(r1));
which is satis￿ed for all r1 S r
￿
1 because the right hand side of this expression is zero at r
￿
1 (by (8) and
(9)) and strictly decreasing in r1 for all r1 (by assumption (15)).
30;31
Case (A). Suppose r1 ￿ r
￿
1; which implies  (r1)+x2 ￿x1 ￿ ￿(r1)+￿[v￿c(r1;0)]: There are three




￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)] + x1 ￿ ￿(r1;re
2(r1))
￿
= ￿￿c1(r1;0) ￿ ￿1(r1;re
2(r1)); which is negative for all r1 by assumption (15).
31Recall that excluding early investment cost and absent early renegotiation, S’s earns a payo￿ of x1 + ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)] from
early breach occurring and ￿(r1;re
2(r1)) from early breach not occurring. Therefore, ￿(r1;re
2(r1)) S x1 + ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)] for all
r1 S r￿
1 implies that (i) when r1 is less than r￿
1; early investment is more valuable to S if early breach occurs; and (ii) when r1
is greater than r￿
1; early investment is more valuable to her if early breach does not occur.
22uS = x1 + [v – c(r1,0)] – r1
Realizations
of cE1:
(r1) + x2 – x1 0 v (r1) + [v – c(r1,0)]
uS =   (r1,r2
e(r1)) – r1
















Figure 4: Seller’s payo￿s after early renegotiation in Case (A), where r1 ￿ r￿
1:
(i) If cE1 ￿  (r1)+x2 ￿x1; early breach always occurs. Social surplus is v￿cE1 +￿[v￿c(r1;0)]￿r1
for these realizations of cE1; so the marginal net social return from increasing r1 slightly is ￿￿c1(r1;0)￿1:
Since S’s private payo￿ is x1 + ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)] ￿ r1 in this range, her marginal net private return from
increasing r1 corresponds to the net social return.
(ii) If  (r1) + x2 ￿ x1 < cE1 ￿ ￿(r1) + ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)]; early breach still occurs because of early
renegotiation, and so the marginal social return from increasing r1 is still ￿￿c1(r1;0) ￿ 1: For these
realizations of cE1; however, S’s private expected payo￿ given early renegotiation is ￿(r1;r
e
2(r1)) ￿ r1 +
￿f￿(r1) + ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)] ￿ cE1g (Lemma 7), and so her marginal private return is
￿1(r1;r
e
2(r1)) + ￿f 
0(r1) ￿ ￿1(r1;r
e
2(r1)) ￿ ￿c1(r1;0)g ￿ 1
= ￿f 
0(r1) ￿ ￿c1(r1;0)g + (1 ￿ ￿)￿1(r1;r
e
2(r1)) ￿ 1:
The marginal private return of S from increasing r1 exceeds the marginal social return, ￿￿c1(r1;0) ￿ 1;
if and only if ￿ 
0(r1)+(1￿￿)f￿1(r1;r
e
2(r1))+￿c1(r1;0)g ￿ 0; which is indeed satis￿ed because r1 ￿ r
￿
1
and (19) imply  
0(r1) ￿ 0 while r1 ￿ r
￿
1 and footnote 30 imply ￿1 + ￿c1 ￿ 0:
(iii) If ￿(r1) + ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)] < cE1; early breach never occurs. The continuation social surplus is
v ￿  (r1) ￿ x2 + ￿(r1;r
e
2(r1)) ￿ r1 from these realizations of cE1; and the marginal social return from
increasing r1 is ￿1(r1;r
e
2(r1)) ￿  
0(r1) ￿ 1; which is less than ￿1(r1;r
e
2(r1)) ￿ 1; i.e. S’s marginal private
return (recall r1 ￿ r
￿
1 and (19) implies  
0(r1) ￿ 0).
So to summarize case (A), when r1 ￿ r
￿
1; S’s marginal net private return from increasing r1 slightly is
weakly greater than the marginal net social return for all realizations of cE1: Hence ￿
0(r1) ￿ S
0(r1) ￿ 0
when r1 ￿ r
￿
1:
Case (B). If r1 ￿ r
￿
1; then  (r1) + x2 ￿ x1 ￿ ￿(r1) + ￿[v ￿ c(r1;0)]: S’s payo￿s for all possible
realizations of cE1 are depicted in Figure 5.
Similary to the previous case, it can be shown that S’s marginal net private return to increasing r1
slightly is weakly less than the marginal net social return for all cE1: Therefore ￿
0(r1) ￿ S
0(r1) ￿ 0 for
all r1 ￿ r
￿
1:
Hence, given any a contract (p;x1;x2) where x1 and x2 are the e￿cient expectation damages (satisfy-
ing (8) and (9)), S’s privately optimal early investment (the value of r1 that maximizes ￿(r1)) is indeed
the e￿cient one, r
￿
1:












uS = x1 + [v – c(r1,0)] – r1 uS =x1 +   [v – c(r1,0)] – r1







(r1) + x2 – x1 (r1) + [v – c(r1,0)] y f q
Figure 5: Seller’s payo￿s after early renegotiation in Case (B), where r1 ￿ r￿
1:
To summarize, any contract (p;x1;x2) where x1 and x2 are the e￿cient expectation damages speci￿ed
in (8) and (9) will induce S to choose the ex-ante e￿cient early investment r
￿
1. The work above shows
that early renegotiation then leads to B making the e￿cient early breach decision, S making the e￿cient
late investment, and B making the e￿cient late breach decision.
Proposition 4 says that the same contract that implements the e￿cient outcome when renegotiation
is not possible also implements the e￿cient outcome when renegotiation is possible. Therefore, renego-
tiation will not occur on the equilibrium path. Nevertheless, it is crucial in establishing Proposition 4
to consider the payo￿s of the parties from choices made o￿ the equilibrium path.
7 An Application
Consider once again the model without renegotiation or mitigation e￿ort (so that the probability of
￿nding an alternate buyer is exogenous). One application of this model is to study the way in which
hotels structure their fees for cancellation of a reservation. There are usually di￿erent cancellation
policies for reservations during the high season versus the low season. For example, the following is a
summary of the deposit and cancellation policies of The Lodge at Vail, a ski resort in Vail, Colorado.
32
Deposit Policies: In the winter season, a 50% deposit is due at the time of booking. The
remaining balance is then due 45 days prior to the arrival. In spring, summer, and fall
seasons, no deposit is required.
Cancellation Policies: In the winter season, a full refund, less the ￿rst night’s room and tax,
will be given if reservations are cancelled more than 45 days prior to arrival. However, there
will be a full forfeiture of the entire reservation value if cancelling within 45 days of arrival.
In spring, summer, and fall seasons, one night’s deposit will be forfeited if cancellation occurs
within 24 hours of arrival.
33
In the case of The Lodge at Vail, their penalities for breach of contract (cancelling the reservation) are
increasing as one approaches the date of performance (start of the reserved stay), regardless of the time
32See http://lodgeatvail.rockresorts.com. For the cancellation policy, see http://lodgeatvail.rockresorts.com/info/rr.fees.asp.
33Even though no deposit it required at the time a reservation is made in the spring, summer, or fall season, the price of one
night’s stay is still charged to the guest if cancellation occurs within 24 hours of arrival.
24of the year. Furthermore, presumably because of higher demand in the winter season for ski resorts, the
di￿erence between their penalties for cancelling late and cancelling early is larger during the winter than
during other times of the year (ignoring the seasonal di￿erence in the de￿nitions of what constitutes a
late breach). This choice of breach damages is consistent with the assumption that it is impossible (or
in general, more di￿cult) to ￿nd an alternate buyer if breach occurs late, and the fact that it is easier
(by de￿nition) to ￿nd an alternate buyer in case of early breach during the high season than low season.
In order to precisely apply the model to this lodging industry example, the parameter ￿ should, strictly
speaking, be interpreted as the probability of ￿nding an alternate buyer/guest (upon early breach) to ￿ll
the same room that was vacated by the incumbent buyer/guest who breached the original contract. (For
example, the seller/hotel may be booked to capacity at the time that the original contract is breached.)
Otherwise, without a binding capacity constraint, the seller may be able to accommodate another buyer
even if early breach does not occur.
Note that the seller/hotel is less likely to be booked to capacity during the low season than during
the high season, which is consistent with ￿ being lower during the low season. Furthermore, whether
breach is considered late or early in the low season depends on whether it occurs within 24 hours prior
to arrival; whereas during the high season breach is considered late if it occurs within 45 days prior to
arrival. The shorter prior notice requirement for early breach during the low season is also consistent
with ￿ being lower during the low season.
To formalize the connection between the Lodge at Vail example and the model, suppose that the
price of the entire reserved stay can be written as np
s; where p
s is the price per night, with s 2 fH;Lg
denoting the season, and n is the number of nights. Assume that the price is higher during the high
season than during the low season, or p
H > p
L (presumably, short-run supply in the lodging industry
is ￿xed), and that the stay is for at least n >
pL
pH + 1 nights. Then the Lodge at Vail’s policy is such






H = (n ￿ 1)p







L during the low season. Thus this example is consistent with the second







the penalty for cancelling a reservation at the last minute is larger in the high season than in the low
season. If the model formally accounts for seasonal variations in the contract price, then this observation
would again be consistent with the model’s predicted e￿cient expectation damages for late breach. (This
claim follows from replacing p with p
H and p






1)) do not depend on p).
Finally, observe that both results in Corollary 3 could have been obtained even if the seller does not
make any investments, or if she only invests before the ￿rst breach decision. If the seller only invests
before the ￿rst breach decision, e￿cient investment and breach decisions can be induced by x2 = p￿c(r
￿
1)
and x1 = p ￿ c(r
￿
1) ￿ ￿[v ￿ c(r
￿
1)] so that x2 ￿ x1 = ￿[v ￿ c(r
￿
1)] > 0. Similarly, if the seller does not
make any investments (r
￿
1 ￿ 0), e￿cient breach decisions can still be induced with (x1;x2) satisfying
x2 ￿ x1 = ￿[v ￿ c(0)] > 0. Therefore, an empirical investigation is necessary to determine whether, and
how, a seller’s investments a￿ect the di￿erence in her chosen penalties for late breach versus early breach
in reality. However, regardless of whether, and when, the seller makes investments, the models predict
that the di￿erence in the penalties for late breach versus early breach, x2 ￿ x1; is increasing in ￿; the
25likelihood of ￿nding an alternate buyer if breach occurs early.
8 Conclusion
This paper studies optimal liquidated damages when breach of contract is possible at multiple points
in time. It suggests that when the potentially breached-against party makes sequential investment
decisions, e￿cient breach damages should increase over time so as to make the potentially breaching
party internalize those increasing opportunity costs. This provides an intuitive explanation for why
fees for cancelling some service contracts, such as hotel reservations, tend to increase as the time for
performance approaches.
Furthermore, when the investing party may be able to ￿nd an alternate trading partner when breach
occurs early but not when breach occurs late, it is shown that the amount by which the damages for
late breach exceeds the damages for early breach is increasing in the probability of ￿nding an alternate
trading partner. This provides one possible explanation for why hotels tend to charge larger penalties
for late cancellation of high-season reservations than late cancellation of low-season reservations.
When an incumbent seller, as the potentially breached-against party, can a￿ect the probability of
￿nding an alternate buyer, her private incentives to mitigate breach damages are shown to be socially
insu￿cient whenever she does not have full bargaining power vis-a-vis the alternate buyer. This is
because while mitigation costs are always borne entirely by the incumbent seller, the bene￿ts of mitigation
are shared whenever the alternate buyer has some bargaining power. However, if breach is de￿ned as
not only a function of whether the incumbent buyer refuses trade, but also a function of whether the
incumbent seller is able to trade with an alternate buyer, then the incumbent seller’s mitigation incentives
may be insu￿cient even if she has full bargaining power with the alternate buyer.
Finally, it is shown that when the incumbent buyer and seller are able to renegotiate their original
contract after the arrival of each perfectly competitive entrant, the socially e￿cient breach and investment
decisions can still be implemented with the same e￿cient expectation damages that implement the ￿rst
best outcome absent renegotiation.
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